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I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been said that American labor law is in dire need of ration-
alization. The statutory framework within which it has evolved, and 
presently functions, is complex. The labor relations system created by 
the National Labor Relations Act, and its public sector counterparts, 
has dominated judicial ruminations for many years. Although Board 
and court decisions have "flushed out some of the interstices" of the 
t Michigan Regional Director, American Arbitration Association; member 
of the Michigan Bar; B.A. 1972, M.A. 1975, Wayne State University; J.D. 1980, 
Detroit College of Law.-ED. 
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Act, the system requires the development of innovative processes to re-
duce the polarization which presently characterizes it, and to render it 
more responsive to public interest concerns. The need to provide more 
continuity to the law is most evident from the cases analyzed by this 
author during the Survey period. 
This Survey period saw the penetration of the arbitral forum by 
the judiciary; a disturbance of the formulae established for apportion-
ing damages in duty of fair representation cases; a reaffirmation of the 
preeminence of the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA); an ex-
tension of the discrimination proscription, and renewed vitality of the 
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act; and a lucid treatment of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine and its impact on the regulation of the practice 
of law. As in the past, the basis for this analysis are the Michigan ap-
pellate cases, and where essential to the refinement of an area of law, 
its parallel federal sector development. 
II. ARBITRATION 
The arbitration process is essential to peaceful labor relations. 
Despite its importance, however, courts have, from the inception of 
arbitration, conscientiously struggled with the issue of how much 
deference should be given to arbitrators' decisions. When courts ulti-
mately relinquished their petty jurisdictional rivalries and enshrined ar-
bitration as the "functional" equivalent of litigation, an effective part-
nership was consummated. Recently, however, there seems to be a 
qualified but disturbing retreat from the position which equates arbi-
tration with litigation. This abandonment suggests judicial activism 
and is primarily reflected in the private sector decisions of the 
Michigan courts and the Sixth Circuit during the 1982-83 Survey 
period. 
A. Pol£ce and Fire Arbitration 
By virtue of Public Act No. 312 of 1969, I police and fire services 
are subject to compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. The first such 
dispute to come before a Michigan court during the Survey period was 
Local 1277, AFSCME v. City oj Center Line. 2 Speaking through 
Justice Williams, a unanimous Michigan Supreme Court held that an 
Act 312 arbitration panel did not have the authority to compel the in-
clusion of a layoff clause into the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment. 3 In so deciding, the supreme court reversed a court of appeals 
decision4 which had construed this aspect of Act 312 decision-making 
as falling within the purview of the arbitration panel's authority. 
1. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-.247 (1978). 
2. 414 Mich. 642, 327 N.W.2d 822 (1982). 
3. Id. 
4. 91 Mich. App. 337, 283 N.W.2d 741 (1979). 
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Public Act 312, as amended, entitles a union representing 
employees in the police or fire services and the governmental employer 
to invoke binding arbitration where a dispute exists concerning wages, 
hours or working conditions. 5 The Michigan Supreme Court observed 
that the layoff issue heard and decided by the arbitration panel was 
not economic in nature. 6 As such, the panel would not be bound to 
select the last best offer of settlement submitted by the parties, but 
would be free to fashion its own remedies. The award of the panel, 
however, must be derived from the express or implied terms of the ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement. 7 In this case, it went beyond its 
scope. 
In its analysis, the court cautiously noted that Public Act 312 does 
not specifically delineate the scope of an arbitration panel's authority. 
However, by looking to the Public Employment Relations Act 
(PERA)8 as a complement to Act 312, and reviewing the crucial lan-
guage, the court ascertained that the issue before the panel did not 
fall within the statutory guidelines. 9 .. '[W]ages, hours and other terms 
and conditions of employment' are deemed to be mandatory subjects 
of bargaining."IO The court held that it was only with respect to the 
mandatory subjects that there was a duty to bargain. ll Inasmuch as 
the layoff provision was not considered a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, and therefore beyond the scope of the arbitration panel's 
authority,12 the city did not violate the terms of its collective bargain-
ing agreement by failing to bargain on the issue. 13 
Certainly this decision of the court seems to be linearly consistent 
with previous case holdings in which the courts have suggested that 
management within the public sector maintains substantial govern-
mental authority to make decisions regarding the scope and nature of 
services it is required to provide. 14 The court cited as rationale for its 
5. 414 Mich. at 652-55, 327 N.W.2d at 826-27. 
6. [d. at 645-46, 327 N.W.2d at 823. 
7. [d. at 654-55,327 N.W.2d at 827. 
8. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1978). 
9. 414 Mich. at 651-52, 327 N.W.2d at 825-26. 
10. [d. at 652, 327 N.W.2d at 826. 
11. [d. at 654-55,327 N.W.2d at 827. 
12. However, the court noted, in dicta, that the arbitration panel had the au-
thority to decide the effect of the layoff decision since this was deemed to be a manda-
tory subject of bargaining. [d. at 665, 327 N.W.2d at 831-32. Accord Fibreboard 
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) ("contracting out" of work pre-
viously performed by union members was a mandatory subject of bargaining, thereby 
imposing the requirement of duty to bargain). 
13. 414 Mich. at 661, 327 N.W.2d at 830. 
14. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1090,280 
N.E.2d 286 (1972) (coun granted stay of arbitration because it determined that only 
the school board and not the arbitrators had authority to decide who should be ap-
pointed to a job). Delegation of decision-making to a third-party was thus curtailed. 
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decision the need to preserve a strong management rights clause. IS 
Since the purpose of providing an alternative procedure for the resolu-
tion of disputes is to foreclose the possibility of strikes when an impasse 
in negotiations is reached, a different result would have emasculated 
the authority of the governmental entity. Ostensibly, the legislature 
did not intend to give the arbitration panel unbridled authority to 
compel agreement on permissive subjects of bargaining. 
It is noteworthy to observe that this decision did not reflect any 
marked hostility toward the compulsory arbitration process. The court 
did not rely on the well-established theories of improper delegation of 
governmental authorityl6 and public accountabilityl7 in rendering its 
decision. While it would be premature to say that this decision ren-
dered moribund the objection that a submission of grievances in the 
public sector to an arbitration panel constitutes an unlawful delega-
tion of governmental power, it is indeed enlightening to know that the 
courts do not have to rely on this objection in order to reach a defensi-
ble and proper result. 
B. Public Sector 
The court of appeals heard other notable cases involving public 
sector arbitration during this Survey period. Unlike those involving the 
private sectorl8 where erosion of the principles upholding the efficacy 
of arbitral jurispurdence occurred, its decisions provided support for 
the internal grievance and arbitration processes. 
In Grant Education Association v. Grant Public Schools,19 the 
court of appeals addressed the issue of the clarification of an arbitra-
tor's award. In that case, the plaintiff (grievant) commenced an action 
in circuit court to enforce the arbitrator's award or, alternatively, to 
have the award submitted to the arbitrator for clarification. 20 The 
grievant had received an evaluation from the athletic director con-
cerning her performance as a varsity girls' basketball coach. 21 It was 
determined that there would not be a renewal of the grievant's 
coaching contract for the subsequent teaching season. 22 
The grievant then filed a grievance requesting that she be recom-
mended as the basketball coach for the subsequent school year and 
15. 414 Mich. at 665,327 N.W.2d at 831-32. 
16. See Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 62 Ill. 2d 
, 470, 343 N.E.2d 473 (1976); Morris Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Morris Educ. 
Ass'n, 84 Misc. 2d 675, 376 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1975). 
17. Id. 
18. See infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text. 
19. No. 61897 (Mich. Ct. App. Arr. 25, 1983) (not to be published). 
20. Id. at 1. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
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that her file be expunged of any negative references concerning the 
matter. 23 The arbitrator rendered an award in favor of the grievant, 
granting in full the requested remedies. The Superintendent made a 
motion to renew the grievant's contract, but the school board rejected 
this recommendation. 24 
In remanding the matter to the arbitrator for further considera-
tion' the court of appeals stated that a literal reading of the arbitra-
tion decision, which had required an administrative recommendation 
to be made to the school board for the grievant's re-employm6;lt, led 
'the court to conclude that the arbitrator's decision did not constitute 
an order to renew the coaching contract. 25 Thus, the defendants may 
have followed the letter but not the specific intent of the award. The 
court determined that the ambiguities and factual inconsistencies pro-
vided reasonable grounds for disagreement as to the precise nature of 
the arbitration award, thus necessitating remand to the arbitrator for 
clarification.26 
The result reached by the court is sufficiently buttressed and forti-
fied by the rationale sustaining arbitration. The court did not endeav-
or to interpret the arbitrator's award, thereby subjecting it to the 
philosophical vicissitudes of the judiciary. With this decision, it effec-
tively, albeit temporarily, curtailed the insidious spread of judicial ac-
tivism and preserved bilateral interests by requiring the arbitrator to 
construe the terms and intended impact of his own award. Judicial en-
croachments upon or excursions into unfamiliar terrain were wisely 
avoided. 
C. ~vate Sector 
A long-standing rule of arbitral jurisprudence provides that when 
parties have chosen arbitration as the vehicle to resolve their disputes, 
it is not for the courts to construe an arbitration decision, so long as 
the award draws its essence from the agreement of the parties. This 
aspect, or centerpiece, of arbitration was established in three land-
mark decisions known as the Steelworkers' Trilogy? In several of the 
23. ld. 
24. ld. 
25. ld. at 2. 
26. ld. 
27. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 
564 (1960). In this series of cases, it was determined that while arbitration is a creature 
of the contract, an arbitrator's authority is limited by the governing instrument of the 
collective bargaining agreement. Once it is established that a dispute is subject to the 
grievance process, the arbitrator's interpretation of contract terms which affect the 
dispute becomes controlling. For a detailed analysis of the Steelworkers' Trilogy, see 
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cases to follow, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals and various 
panels of the Sixth Circuit have departed from the holdings in the 
Tr-ilogy. 
In Grand Rapids D-ie Cast-ing Corp. v. Local 159 , 28 an arbitrator's 
award which reinstated the grievant was vacated. In so determining, 
the court held that the arbitrator's decision did not "draw its essence 
from the collective bargaining agreement"29 because the decision did 
not make a finding as to whether the grievant had violated the com-
pany rule on absenteeism or whether just cause existed for the dis-
charge. 3o . 
The court criticized the arbitrator for suggesting that the parties 
revise the discipline procedure. The court was obviously disturbed by 
its perception that the basis for the arbitral decision was a disapproval 
of the procedure.31 Thus, the court determined that the arbitrator 
had violated his oath of fidelity to the process by substituting his own 
terms of reasonableness for those upon which the parties had previous-
ly agreed.32 
The court noted that while deference is to be given to arbitration 
awards, the deference is not unlimited. In this respect, the court 
stated: 
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and applica-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to 
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course 
look for guidance from many sources; yet his award is legiti-
mate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement. When the arb-itrator's words manifest 
an -inJ-ideHty to hz"s obHgations, the courts have no choice but to 
reJuse enforcement oj the award. 33 
The court's ability to accord appropriate deference to an arbitra-
tor's award was also tested in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Teamsters 
Local 243 .34 In that case, the court of appeals affirmed a United States 
District Court decision which had held that an arbitrator exceeded his 
authority by amending the express terms of the agreement negotiated 
Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, DECISIONAL THINKING OF AR· 
BITRATORS AND JUDGES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY·THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, NA· 
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 331 G. Stem & B. Dennis eds. 1980). 
28. 684 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1982). 
29. Id. at 416. 
30. Id. at 415. 
31. Id. at 416. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960». 
34. 683 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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by the parties.35 In reaching this decision, the court of appeals observed 
that an arbitrator has the authority to construe ambiguous contract 
language but lacks the authority to disregard or modify plain or un-
ambiguous contract provisions.36 The court decided that the arbitra-
tor had exceeded his authority by balancing the interests of the par-
ties. It noted that the balancing test should only be used when the col-
lective bargaining agreement is silent on the question of subcontrac-
ting. 37 
In the only case in this area decided by a Michigan court during 
the Survey period, Staniszewski V. Grand Rapids Packaging Corp., 38 
the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the limited scope of judicial 
review of arbitration awards. In Staniszewsk£, the defendant had dis-
charged the plaintiff for violating shop rules. 39 The plaintiff contested 
his discharge through the grievance procedure and was awarded, in an 
arbitration proceedings, reinstatement and "full backpay. "40 A dispute 
subsequently arose as to what constituted the plaintiff's normal 
workweek for purposes of determining the amount of "full backpay." 
The employer argued that standard industrial practices provided for a 
forty-hour workweek, although the parties had previously stipulated 
that the normal workweek was fifty-two hours. 41 
The court held that the term "full backpay" was latently ambigu-
OUS.42 The court defined a latent ambiguity as one which "arises when 
a wTiting on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but there exists 
some collateral matter which makes the meaning uncertain." Only 
then could parol evidence be used to explain such an ambiguity.43 The 
trial court determined that "full backpay" included fifty-two hours 
since that was the grievant's normal workweek and the arbitrator had 
indicated in his testimony that the award encompassed the grievant's 
normal workweek.44 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's 
decision, noting that the trial court maintained the authority to en-
force the arbitrator's award.45 
35. Id. at 156. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. In Klochko Equipment Rental CO. V. Local 324, 110 L.R.R.M. 2875 
(E.D. Mich. 1982), the court dealt with a broad arbitration clause which was silent on 
the reasons for discharge. The court held that the arbitrator has the authority to draw 
on the industrial common law when a collective bargaining agreement does not ex-
pressly distinguish between unsatisfactory work performance and safety rule violations. 
no L.R.R.M. at 2877. 
38. 125 Mich. App. 97, 336 N.W.2d 10 (1983). 
39. Id. at 98, 336 N.W.2d at 10. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 




HeinOnline -- 30 Wayne L. Rev. 744 1983-1984
744 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vo1.30:737 
The most disturbing aspect of the court of appeals decision, how-
ever, was that in its affirmation, it concluded that the trial court's rul-
ing which construed the term "full backpay" was correct. In so con-
cluding, the court stated that "[s]ince the trial court has the authority 
and obligation to enforce the award, it must have the [ derivative] 
authority to determine the meaning of the arbitrator's award."46 In 
light of the elaborate line of cases which support the position that it is 
an arbitrator who must decide the meaning and scope of his award 
and not the court, this dicta flies squarely in the face of precedent.47 
The impropitious comments do not augur well for the arbitral process 
and suggest that perhaps in the private sector, courts may become less 
inclined to remain passive. 
Several of the decisions rendered by the Michigan and Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals during this Survey period have undermined the 
arbitration system by interpreting arbitrators' awards and disturbing 
the finality aspect of their decisions. As conceived, the system was 
designed to provide speed, economy and equity in the resolution of in-
dustrial relations disputes. Even a partial abrogation of the national 
and local policies favoring arbitration as a responsive, thorough and 
binding method of dispute resolution will only serve to undermine the 
efficacy of the process and taint the credibility of its results. 
III. DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES 
Ostensibly influenced by the United States Supreme Court's preoc-
cupation with employment discrimination during the 1982-83 term,48 
the Michigan courts rendered more decisions affecting the law of 
discriminatory practices in the workplace than in any other area of 
labor relations. The strides engendered by the federal decisions reflect 
an increased activism on the part of the judiciary to extend the 
parameters of the discrimination proscription. The philosophical 
underpinnings of these decisions have spilled over into the Michigan 
judicial forum. 
46. Id. 
47. See Steelworkers' Trilogy, supra note 27. 
48. In March 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
rendered a crucial decision on the issue of whether an employer who paid female em-
ployees in one establishment less than male employees in another establishment vio-
lated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The court answered this question in the 
affirmative. In so holding, it noted that a charge of sexual discrimination pursuant to 
Title VII is broader than the Equal Pay Act, and although to qualify for a violation of 
the Equal Pay Act it must be demonstrated that the employer's conduct was similarly 
violative of Title VII, the converse is not true. To allow otherwise would subvert the in-
tention of Congress and thereby deprive victims of discrimination of an appropriate 
remedy. Bartelt v. Berlitz School of Languages of America, Inc., 698 F.2d 1003 (9th 
CiT. 1983). 
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One of the most important developments during the current 
Survey period was the renewed viability of the Elliott-Larsen Civil 
Rights Act49 once the Michigan Court of Appeals erased the doubts as 
to the Act's constitutionality. 50 
A. Sex Discrimination 
In the first significant sex discrimination case handled by the 
Michigan Court of Appeals during the Survey period, Northville 
Public Schools v. Civil Rights Commission,51 the claimant notified her 
employer that she intended to utilize her accumulated sick leave and 
personal leave days for childbirth and recuperation. Her request was 
denied by the school board, although she was provided with a tem-
porary leave of absence without pay for a period equivalent to the sum 
of the sick leave and personal leave days. 52 The claimant's case took a 
rather arduous journey through various civil rights commission levels 
and finally reached the judicial forum. The court of appeals held that 
the school district's refusal to allow its female employees to use sick 
days for maternity purposes constituted sexual discrimination within 
the meaning of the superceded Fair Employment Practices Act. 53 
In reaching its decision, the court noted the persuasive effect of 
federal precedent, but properly subordinated it. The court of appeals 
stated that the cases on which the circuit c0l;lrt had primarily relied54 
in reaching its decision were "not necessarily a reliable guide as to 
what our Legislature intended" inasmuch as these cases were decided 
prior to the legislative enactment on employment discrimination. 55 
49. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2101·.2804 (Supp. 1983·84). 
50. As noted in the previous Survey article, the finding by the late Honorable 
Joseph Rashid that the Act was unconstitutional in its entirety for violating the title· 
object clause of the Michigan Constitution (MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 24), was reversed 
by the court of appeals during the current Survey period. Seals v. Henry Ford Hos· 
pital, 123 Mich. App. 329, 333 N.W.2d 272 (1983). For a discussion of Seals and other 
cases from the 1981-82 Survey period which ruled on the constitutionality of the 
Elliott-Larsen Act, see Raymond & Nuyen, LaboT Law, 1982 Ann. Survey of Mich. 
Law, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 841, 863-64 & nn. 123-27. 
In addition, prior to the court of appeals decision in Seals, the court of appeals in 
Bully v. General Motors Corp., 120 Mich. App. 165, 172, 328 N.W.2d 24,27 (1982), 
had held that "the provision against sex discrimination contained in § 3a of the [Fair 
Employment Practices Act, MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 423.301-.311 (1978)(repealed 
and replaced by the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, supra note 49)] did not violate the 
title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution prior to the title's amendment on Oc-
tober 5, 1972." 
51. 118 Mich. App. 573, 325 N.W.2d 497 (1982). 
52. Id. at 575, 325 N.W.2d at 498. 
53. Id. at 576-77, 325 N.W.2d at 498-99. 
54. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
55. 118 Mich. App. at 577,325 N.W.2d at 499. 
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Furthermore, Congress had outwardly undone the mischief generated 
by G£lbert by enacting a superceding Title VII amendment. 56 
In Department of C£v£l R£ghts ex rel. Cornell v. Edward A. Spar-
row Hosp£tal AssoC£atz"on, 57 the court of appeals was required to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff qualified for backpay and attorney fees 
once a prima facie case of discrimination was established. 58 The court 
noted that the Michigan statute clearly makes an award of backpay 
discretionary. Plaintiff could have continued to work while challeng-
ing the dress code. Her election to discontinue work coupled with the 
discretionary nature of the relief afforded by the statute rendered the 
lower court ruling meritorious. The plaintiff initiated her lawsuit 
under the former Fair Employment Practices Act which did not pro-
vide for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing complainant. The 
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act was found to be inapposite to this fac-
tual matrix. 59 
Despite what appears to be a proper holding in the case, the deci-
sion of the court to withhold backpay is quixotic thinking at best. 
While backpay awards are clearly discretionary, it seems to thwart the 
overall purpose of this remedial piece of legislation to establish the ex-
istence of an unfair employment practice and simultaneously preclude 
the framing of relief for the complainant. Notably, Judge MacKenzie 
raised this very point in her dissent in Sparrow. 60 
This perplexing decision of the appellate bench leaves the victim 
of discrimination remedially destitute. Although the type of discrimi-
nation involved in this case was clearly not tantamount to the more 
typical, purposeful and invidious discrimination where one is deprived 
of gainful employment opportunities, it would seem that the statutory 
purpose of the Civil Rights Act in eradicating discrimination becomes 
further frustrated when complainants are given meaningless verdicts 
in their favor. Certainly through the exercise of the discretion which 
56. Id. 
57. 119 Mich. App. 387, 326 N.W.2d 519 (1982). 
58. Id. at 391·92,326 N.W.2d at 52l. 
59. Id. at 392·93, 326 N.W.2d at 52l. 
60. 
Congress' prupose in vesting a variety of "discretionary" powers in the 
courts was not to limit appellate review of trial courts, or to invite incon· 
sistency and caprice, but rather to make possible the "fashion[ing] [of] the 
most complete relief possible." 
It follows that, given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay 
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not 
frustrate the central statutory purpose of eradicating discrimination 
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered 
through past discrimination (footnote omitted). 
119 Mich. App. at 395, 326 N.W.2d at 522 (MacKenzie, j., dissenting) (quoting AI· 
bermale Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975». 
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the legislation has provided, the court could have fashioned a form of 
relief based upon the egregiousness of the employers' conduct. Its elec-
tion to do othenvise has not only placed this area of the law in a state 
of flux, but more importantly, perpetuated the very injustices the 
drafters of the legislation envisioned would cease to exist. 
B. Marital Discrimination 
This Survey period saw several interesting marital discrimination 
cases unfold. In the first case, Heath v. Alma Plastics Company,61 the 
plaintiff filed an action alleging both sex and marital discrimination 
in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Cjvil Rights Act and the minimum 
wage law in paying her less than was paid to similarly situated males. 
The circuit court found that the defendant had discriminated against 
the plaintiff and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. 62 
On appeal, it was determined that the factual finding of sex dis-
crimination was well supported by the evidence at trial. Nevertheless, 
the court determined that the granting of liquidated damages was 
discretionary and declined to award them, explaining that they would 
be "too punitive."63 
During the Survey period, Miller v. C. A. Muer Corp.64 presented 
a case of first impression for the Michigan courts. The plaintiff had 
been employed as a waiter at one of the defendant's restaurants. 
When he announced his intention to marry a co-worker, he was in-
formed that the defendant corporation's "no-spouse rule" precluded 
married couples from working in the same restaurant. The plaintiff 
terminated his employment and proceeded to marry his fiancee. He 
then filed an action based on the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, seek-
ing relief on the basis that the no-spouse rule violated the section of 
the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act which prohibits discriminatory 
employment practices based on marital status. 65 
Inasmuch as this represented a case of first impression, the 
Michigan court had to look to analogous statutes in other jurisdictions 
in order to assign a proper meaning to marital status. The court was 
hampered in its decision-making by several factors: (a) marital status 
is not defined in the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act and, (b) there is a 
split among the jurisdictions as to whether no-spouse rules should be 
permitted or held to be violative of employment practices. 66 In looking 
to the legislative purpose and objectives of the Elliott-Larsen Civil 
61. 121 Mich. App. 137, 328 N.W.2d 598 (1982). 
62. Id. at 140, 328 N.W.2d at 599. 
63. Id. at 144, 328 N.W.2d at 601. 
64. 124 Mich. App. 780, 336 N.W.2d 215 (1983). 
65. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (1)(a) (Supp. 1983·84). 
66. 124 Mich. App. at 781, 336 N.W.2d at 216. 
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Rights Act, the court held that the legislature's intent would be fur-
thered "by construing the term 'marital status' to include a prohibition 
against discriminatory employment practices based on the identity of 
one's spouse."67 Finding that the distinction did not qualify for the 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of the business, the court held for the plaintiff. 
C. Age Discrimination 
This Survey period yielded a very noteworthy age discrimination 
case by the United States Supreme Court. 68 With the United States Su-
preme Court's five-to-four decision in EEOC v. Wyoming,69 the effect 
of the federal discrimination proscription on state laws was established. 
In Wyoming, the Court determined whether the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA) covering state and local governments was 
a valid exercise of the commerce clause under the Tenth Amendment 
or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The gravamen of this case 
was the involuntary retirement of a state employed game warden at 
age 55 pursuant to a Wyoming statute. 70 The plaintiff initiated an ac-
tion in federal district court. The suit was dismissed on the theory that 
an attempt to regulate the state's employment relationship with its 
game wardens was a violation of the tenth amendment's immunity71 as 
articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery. 72 
The Supreme Court opinion, written by Justice Brennan, held 
that the purpose of the tenth amendment immunity doctrine is to pro-
tect states from federal intrusions that might threaten their separate 
and independent existence. 73 The primary consideration in determi-
ning whether the ADEA could effectively supercede state law was if 
the states' compliance with federal law directly impaired their ability 
"to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions. "74 Finding that the social policy of dismissing those wardens 
unfit to perform their responsibilites would not be hampered, nor 
would there be substantial and unintended consequential effects on 
67. [d. at 782,336 N.W.2d at 217. 
68. For the reader who desires to become more familiar with recent trends in 
age discrimination, see Vercruysse, Summary Judgments Under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act: The Rational View, 61 MICH. BAR]. 522 Quly 1982). 
69. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). 
70. [d. at 1059. 
71. [d. at 1060. 
72. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
73. 103 S. Ct. at 1060. 
74. [d. at 1061 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981». 
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state decision-making in other areas, the court held that the ADEA 
applied to state governments and their local subdivisions. 75 
The implications of this decision for Michigan practitioners is 
clear. Forced early retirements (primarily in the public sector), hereto-
fore deemed lawful under municipal charters, are now unlawful pur-
suant to the holding in Wyomz"ng. 
IV. DuTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 
The duty of fair representation involves the obligation of a union 
to fully and fairly represent the employees for whom it acts as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative.76 The early decisions in this area 
arose in the context of union discrimination. 77 The more recent duty 
of fair representation cases have been directed at the union's failure to 
assume responsibility for processing a worker's grievance to arbitration 
where arbitration is the final step of the grievance procedure. 
The seminal Survey case which dealt with the duty of fair repre-
sentation and served as a federal precursor for the Michigan cases to 
follow was Bowen v. Unz"ted States Postal Service. 78 In this case, the 
petitioner-employee was discharged subsequent to an altercation with 
a co-worker. Shortly thereafter, he filed a grievance with the union 
against the employer based upon express provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement. 79 The union did not pursue the matter to arbi-
tration, and the petitioner-employee then sought damages and injunc-
tive relief against the union and the employer in federal district 
court.80 Judgment was entered on a jury determination which held 
that Bowen was wrongfully discharged and the union had increased 
his damages by handling his grievance in an arbitrary, capricious and 
perfunctory manner, thereby breaching its duty of fair representa-
tion. 81 
75. 103 S. Ct. at 1062. 
76. Although the duty of fair representation is not derived from the National 
Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 151·69 (1976», court and NLRB decisions have 
rendered it "a federal obligation which has been judicially fashioned from national 
labor statutes." Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1251 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971). See also Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor 
Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Textile Workers v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In large measure, the evolution of this duty can be 
attributed to the statutorily mandated concept of exclusivity. See National Labor Re· 
lations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); Railway Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 
(1976). 
77. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Tunstall v. Brother· 
hood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
78. 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983). 
79. Id. at 590. 
80. Id. at 590·91. 
81. 470 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (W.D. Va. 1979). 
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's 
judgment, but disturbed the award of damages against the union. The 
court held that because the employee's "compensation was at all times 
payable only by the Service, reimbursement of his lost earnings con-
tinued to be the obligation of the Service exclusively .... [Thus] no 
portion of the deprivations . . . was chargeable to the Union. "82 
In a five-to-four majority decision, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the petitioner's damages were caused by the union's 
breach of its duty of fair representation, and accordingly, apportion-
ment of damages was required. 83 In so holding, the Court applied the 
governing principle of Vaca v. Sipes84 that" 'damages attributable 
solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be charged to 
the union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the union's 
refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the em-
ployer.' "85 
In an insightful analysis, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, 
addressed the equities of assessing the primary financial burden on the 
union. The Court's rationale emphasized that the grievance procedure 
is "[f]undamental to federal labor policy."86 Such a procedure pro-
vides parties with a meaningful and harmonious means of determining 
and defining their rights and obligations. The Court said, however, 
that while the bargaining relationship requires commitment on the 
part of both parties to maximize its efficacy, the union maintains the 
"pivotal role in the process since it determines whether to press an em-
ployee's claim. "87 
Obviously, this perceived inequity is non-existent. The union has 
sought and acquired the exclusive right to act on behalf of the mem-
bers of the bargaining unit. Circumscribed within the fundamental 
right is the duty to discharge the agency responsibility faithfully and 
exhaustively. 
Blunting the impact of the majority decision was a persuasive dis-
sent written by Justice White and joined by Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun and Rehnquist. The minority position relied on cases subse-
quent to Vaca v. Sipes which had held that a "union is liable in 
damages to the extent that its misconduct 'add[ s] to the difficulty and 
expense of collecting from the employer.' "88 In this context, damages 
82. 642 F.2d 79, 82 (4th Cir. 1981). 
83. 103 S. Ct. at 599. 
84. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
85. 103 S. Ct. at 595 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 186, 197-98) (emphasis 
added by Bowen Court). 
86. 103 S. Ct. at 596. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 602 (White, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970». 
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imposed on a union would be minimal since the main responsibility 
would rest with the party who committed the wrongful discharge, the 
employer. 89 
The interesting aspect of Bowen which provides many of the 
undercurrents for the successive sections of this article is the effect the 
slim majority was able to achieve through its decision. As one of the 
most important cases decided during this Survey period, the ramifica-
tions of Bowen for internal union affairs are substantial. In essence, 
the parameters of the duty of fair representation have been redefined. 
Repercussions of this reassessment of liability include a) increasing 
union vulnerability to lawsuits, thereby adversely increasing the risk of 
frivolous grievances being filed in arbitration, b) disturbing the finan-
cial stability of labor organizations and, c) reducing the likelihood that 
meaningful collective bargaining will occur because parties will pre-
maturely substitute arbitration for the negotiations and predispute re-
solution stages of the collective process. 
In a case decided subsequent to Bowen, but which did not cite the 
Bowen opinion, the Sixth Circuit continued to follow previous prece-
dent in holding that more than a possibly negligent mistake in judg-
ment must be proven in order to establish that a union has breached 
its duty of fair representation. In Poole V. Budd Co. ,90 the union had' 
declined to proceed to arbitration with the plaintiff's grievance. The 
district court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove any breach of 
duty by the union and, accordingly, granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants, the employer and the union, on the plaintiff's 
wrongful discharge claims.91 The plaintiff appealed the case to the 
Sixth Circuit which affirmed the district court's holding. 
The court stated that, at most, the plaintiff had shown an error in 
judgment by the union, which might establish negligence. 92 Relying 
upon pre-Bowen cases, the court held that "[ m Jere negligence is insuf-
ficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. "93 Since 
the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof, the court affirmed 
the grant of summary judgment. 
Although the Budd court did not cite Bowen, the Sixth Circuit's 
holding could represent an effort on its part to retreat from the 
holding and dicta in Bowen which suggested that the mere negligent 
treatment of a grievance would subject the union and, of course, the 
employer to liability for damages. 94 The ruling by the Sixth Circuit in 
89. 103 S. Ct. at 602 (White, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
90. 706 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1983). 
91. Id. at 182. 
92. Id. at 184. 
93. Id. 
94. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text. 
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Budd may indicate that the court is not willing to accept the posture 
of the United States Supreme Court in Bowen. 
In retrospect, it would seem that the effects of Bowen and its prog-
eny, while serious, are readily transparent. The requirement that 
liability will be reapportioned in accordance with the degree of fault 
assigned in a tandem suit against the union and the employer provides 
a fairly strong incentive for parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment to carefully police the grievance procedure. Although Bowen 
disturbed the liability governed by traditional federal common law 
principles, the negative side effects mentioned earlier in this section 
could be avoided if unions and employers proceed with continued per-
sistence in attempting to perfect their collective bargaining and 
grievance procedure modalities. 
Nevertheless, there remains a paramount concern that judicial in-
tervention into the arbitration process will be commonplace where fair 
representation cases are involved. Clearly, in view of the considera-
tions articulated in Section II of this article, arbitral finality becomes 
emasculated. Since an arbitrator does not have the actual authority to 
determine whether the union has engaged in conduct which is "arbi-
trary, discriminatory or in bad faith, "95 the courts ultimately become 
involved in the dispute. This involvement inevitably leads to judicial 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, a responsibility 
heretofore reserved exclusively to the person jointly appointed by labor 
and management to dispose of the grievance, the arbitrator. 
V. FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
The gravamen of the federal preemption doctrine is an actual or 
potential conflict between national and state entities which regulate 
activity under the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA).96 The 
state has the authority to invoke jurisdiction over matters which by 
"litigated elucidation" have not been carved out of its bailiwick. The 
activity which falls under its umbrella of regulation is deemed pro-
tected. 
The conflicts to which the preemption theory is applied arise out 
of the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations BoardY To deter-
mine whether preemption analysis is required to resolve regulatory 
scheme conflicts, a two-part test is generally employed: (a) whether 
the matter in issue is part of the central scheme of the federal act, and 
(b) whether the actual or potential conflict between forums require 
preemption. The latter is determined by balancing the focus and pur-
95. Vaca v. Sipes. 386 U.S. 186. 190 (1967). 
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141·88 (1976). 
97. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
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pose of the federal act against the weight to be assigned to the local 
concern.98 
One of the most interesting yet illustrative cases addressing the 
preemption doctrine was Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp.99 The employee 
brought an action against her employer on a breach of employment 
contract claim, asserting violation of her section 1985100 rights and 
claiming that her discharge was predicated upon her support of the 
formation of a union. The United States District Court, through Judge 
Freeman, held that the claims which the plaintiff posited were identi-
cal to claims of unfair labor practice in violation of the National 
Labor Relations Act, and thus she was precluded from securing the 
benefits of the state substantive law upon which she requested relief. 
The court, relying upon the initial line of preemption analysis devel-
oped in Garmon,lOl cautiously observed: 
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, 
the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclu-
sive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the 
danger of state interference with national policy is to be 
averted. 102 
Despite the fact that the plaintiff had prepared her complaint so 
as to trigger the substantive aspects of state law, the court noted that 
the application of the preemption doctrine is only affected by the 
nature of the conduct supporting the claim, not the legal theories set 
forth in the complaint. loa Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to dis-
courage membership in any labor organization. "104 The nature of the 
conduct under scrutiny is not "of peripheral concern to the federal 
labor laws" nor does it "touch interests deeply rooted in local feeling 
and responsibility."105 Since the plaintiff's claim fell exclusively within 
the rubric of paramount governmental concerns, it was deemed pre-
empted by federal labor laws. l06 
98. Id. See also Fanner v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977). 
99. 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). 
101. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
102. 541 F. Supp. at 482. 
103. Id. at 483. 
104. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976). 
105. 541 F. Supp. at 483. 
106. For a case which does not specifically deal with the regulation of labor rela-
tions but which is nevertheless instructive insofar as it demonstrates the applicability of 
federal legislation where the states have otherwise sought to regulate this type of activ-
HeinOnline -- 30 Wayne L. Rev. 754 1983-1984
754 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vo1.30:737 
A question of first impression was raised in Rodrz"guez v. Grand 
Trunk Western R.R. Co., 107 in which the defendant contended that 
the trial court erred in concluding that the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act (FELA)108 venue statute was applicable to a personal injury ac-
tion brought in a state court. Action was commenced in Wayne Coun-
ty under FELA. The defendant then sought to invoke the jurisdiction 
of Oakland County to determine whether it had been negligent in fail-
ing to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work. The trial court 
denied the defendant's motion, ruling that the FELA venue provision 
superceded the state's statute, and that venue in Wayne County was 
proper. 10g On appeal, the court reversed and remanded the case, 
holding that where an action has been brought in a state court, the 
venue is to be determined by the trial court in accordance with the 
Michigan venue statute. 110 
The holding pronounced by the Rodrz"guez court relating to the 
constitutionality of the state venue statute was extrapolated from dicta 
in Bauman v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co.l11 In Bauman, the 
supreme court ably noted: 
Limiting the venue of plaintiff's action to the county of his 
residence does not deprive him of any right or privilege 
granted by either the Constitution of the State or by the Con-
stitution of the United States. It is within the power of the leg-
islature to prescribe where actions may be brought and to im-
pose reasonable limitations with reference thereto. 1l2 
By relying upon this dicta, the Rodrz"guez court properly found that no 
constitutional defect existed in the statutory scheme and that the 
venue statute did not impermissibly intrude upon or affect the exercise 
of the plaintiff's fundamental right of access to the court's system. ll3 
Therefore, the state venue statute governs venue in FELA actions 
brought in a state court. 
In reviewing the preemption cases decided during this Survey 
period, it is significant to note that the courts have broadened the pre-
emption doctrine at the same time that they have reaffirmed the tradi-
ity vis·a·vis legislation, see Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural 
Marktg. and Bargaining Bd., 416 Mich. 706, 332 N.W.2d 134 (1982). 
107. 120 Mich. App. 599, 328 N.W.2d 89 (1982) (leave to appeal pending). 
108. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976). 
109. 120 Mich. App. at 601, 328 N.W.2d at 90. 
1l0. Id. at 604, 328 N.W.2d at 9l. 
lll. 353 Mich. 279, 91 N.W.2d 279 (1958). 
H2. Id. at 286, 91 N.W.2d at 282, quoted z"n Rodrz"guez, 120 Mich. App. at 
604, 328 N.W.2d at 92. 
lllB. 120 Mich. App. at 605, 328 N.W.2d at 92. 
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tional factors which preserve state jurisdiction. If the state interest is 
sufficiently compelling, then the preemption doctrine will not be used 
as a guise to oust the state of the power to regulate activities which 
might simply be deemed tangential or of peripheral concern to the 
federal act. Although federal preeminence could be achieved by the 
application of the commerce clause, the recent decisions of the court 
of appeals suggest that the primary concern of the court is not whether 
a potential conflict between state and federal legislation exists, but 
rather an actual conflict in an area which Congress has dominated. 
VI. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT (PERA) 
The Public Employment Relations Act (PERA)114 was enacted in 
1965 for the purpose of providing and regulating the organizational 
rights of public employees. Since its implementation, judicial interpre-
tations of the law have extended the scope of its coverage to include 
local court administrative personnel. 115 
The judicial challenges raised under PERA during this Survey 
period are not as extensive as those raised during the previous term. 116 
Nevertheless, the growing emphasis of the law appears to affect the 
rights of probationary employees in the education sector. It is this 
group of public employees to which the first set of appellate decisions 
are addressed. 
A. Probationary Employees-Status of Rights and Obligations 
Challenged in the first case was the notice provision of the 
Michigan Teachers' Tenure Act. 117 In Dailey V. Mackinac Island Board 
of Education, 118 the plaintiff, a first-year probationary school teacher, 
was informed that his contract would not be renewed for the subsequent 
year because of economic conditions. The trial court refused to grant 
mandamus relief for reinstatement, and the matter was appealed to 
the Michigan Court of Appeals. 
In affirming the lower court ruling, the court of appeals held that 
the notice provision of the Michigan Teachers' Tenure Act is activated 
only when a contract is discontinued for non-economic reasons. 119 The 
court summarily rejected the plaintiff's position that the "defendant 
may not discontinue the employment of a probationary teacher for 
114. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1978). 
115. See Teamsters Local 214 V. 60th Dist. Ct., 102 Mich. App. 216, 302 
N.W.2d 203 (1980); Hillsdale Community Schools V. Labor Mediation Bd., 24 Mich. 
App. 36, 179, N.W.2d 661, leave to appeal denied, 384 Mich. 779 (1970). 
116. See Raymond & Nuyen, supra note 50, at 842-52. 
117. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 38.71-.172 (Supp. 1983-84). 
118. 120 Mich. App. 187, 327 N.W.2d 431 (1982). 
119. Id. at 189, 327 N.W.2d at 432. 
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any reason unless that teacher has first been notified at least 60 days 
from the close of the school year that his or her work has been unsatis-
factory."12o The court noted that this was a correct interpretation only 
where a contract had been terminated because of unsatisfactory work 
performance, which was not the situation presented in the instant 
case. Accordingly, the court held that the tenure act "is not applic-
able to probationary teaching contracts terminated for economic rea-
sons. "121 
In Napoleon Education Association v. Napoleon Community 
Schools,122 a "dual motive" case, the court of appeals. affirmed a 
Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERe) determination 
that the plaintiff, a probationary teacher, had been dismissed for en-
gaging in protected concerted activity under section nine of PERA. 123 
The defendant claimed that there had been a misallocation of the 
burden of proof by MERC. 
The commission had used a burden of proof analysis developed by 
the NLRB and clarified by the First Circuit in NLRB v. Wright 
Line .124 The commission quoted the following section of the NLRB 
opinion: 
'First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a 
prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that 
protected conduct was a 'motivating factor' in the employer's 
decision. Once this is established, the burden will shift to the 
employer to demonstrate that the same action would have 
taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.' 251 
NLRB # 150, P 1083; 150 LRRM 1169 (1980).125 
As in Wright Line, the question on appeal was which burden had 
been shifted. As the First Circuit had done in Wright Line, 126 the 
court of appeals concluded that the commission's "references to de-
fendant's failure to meet its burden were references to defendant's 
burden of production."127 
As to the defendant's claim that the commission's decision was not 
supported by the evidence, the court noted that "the great weight of 
the evidence does not rest with either side ... therefore, [we] defer to 
MERC's judgment."128 Accordingly, the MERC decision was affirmed. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. (citing Boyce v. Royal Oak Bd. of Educ., 407 Mich. 312, 285 N.W.2d 
196 (1979». 
122. 125 Mich. App. 398, 336 N.W.2d 481 (1983). 
123. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 423.209 (1978). 
124. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). 
125. 125 Mich. App. at 400, 336 N.W.2d at 481 (quoting MERC opinion). 
126. See 662 F.2d at 904-07. 
127. 125 Mich. App. at 404, 336 N.W.2d at 484. 
128. Id. at 406, 336 N.W.2d at 484. The court noted that there is a general 
HeinOnline -- 30 Wayne L. Rev. 757 1983-1984
1984] LABOR LAW AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPo 
B. Duty to Barga£n-Mandatory V. Perm'iss£ve Subjects of 
Bargaz"nz"ng 
757 
In C£ty of Detro£t V. Mz"chz"gan Coundl25, AFSCME129 the court of 
appeals affirmed MERe's decision that the subject matter of a recent-
ly enacted ordinance represented a mandatory subject of bargaining, 
and "that through the ordinance the city had unilaterally made 
changes without properly fulfilling its statutory obligations to meet, 
confer and bargain 'with [its labor organization]."13o The court reason-
ed that the composition of the Board of Trustees of the General 
Retirement System and the Policemen and Firemen Retirement 
System of the City of Detroit and the powers they exhibited were 
substantial and had a significant effect upon conditions of employ-
ment by determining who was entitled to increases or premature 
benefits under the duty disability pension benefit package. l3l 
The decision in Cz"ty of Detroz"t, which includes a portion of the 
MERC analysis, indicates an eagerness to overcome the stigma attach-
ed to its decision-making prowess. Labor practitioners of all persua-
sions were concerned with the court of appeals' previous ruling in 
AFSCME V. Macomb County Road Comm'issz"on 132 in which MERC 
and the court of appeals had difficulty determining the existence or 
non-existence of a bargaining impasse. Certainly, the Cz"ty of Detroz"t 
case is a legitimate retreat from the legal imbroglio created by MERC. 
Both the commission and the court of appeals endeavored to broadly 
interpret the duty to bargain in order to expand its reach, taking into 
consideration that public employees do not maintain the strike 
weapon. The court of appeals recognized the inequities which existed 
in the change of membership in the Board of Trustees in the retire-
ment system and acted swiftly and decisively to protect employee 
rights. 
VII. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Unlike the prior year which produced substantial appellate litiga-
tion and legislation,133 the development of unemployment compensa-
tion law was not extensive during this Survey period. Nonetheless, 
there were several significant decisions that deserve mention. 
reluctance on the part of courts to disturb administrative decisions. Courts will defer 
to the board's expertise '''and not invade the province of exclusive administrative fact-
finding by displacing an agency's choice between two reasonably differing views.'" Id. 
(quoting MERC V. Detroit Symphony Orchestra, 393 Mich. 116, 124, 223 N.W.2d 
283, 287·88 (1974». 
129. 118 Mich. App. 211, 324 N.W.2d 578 (1982), leave to appeal pending. 
130. Id. at 214, 324 N.W.2d at 580. 
131. Id. at 218-19, 324 N.W.2d at 581-82. 
132. 101 Mich. App. 91, 300 N.W.2d 462 (1980). 
133. See Vincent & Batten, Unemployment Insurance, 1982 Ann. Survey of 
Mich. Law, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1037 (1983). 
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A. The Labor Dispute Qualification 
Michigan law disqualifies a person from securing unemployment 
benefits if the unemployment grows out of a labor dispute transpiring 
in the establishment of the claimant, or if the dispute is not on the 
premises, but is one which is "functionally integrated" with the struck 
establishment, and operated by the same employer .134 To be subject to 
disqualification, the claimant must be found to be "directly involved" 
in the dispute. 135 In this Survey period only one case arose concerning 
the scope of involvement in a labor dispute. 
In Anderson v. Top O'Michigan Rural Electric Co., 136 the claim-
ants were members of Local 876 of the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, whose collective bargaining agreement contained 
a no-strike clause. When the office workers went on strike, the workers 
refused to cross the picket line. Claimants' subsequent applications for 
unemployment benefits were denied because they were deemed to 
have been involved in a labor dispute. Claimants then located other 
employment. When they were laid off from their successor jobs, they 
re-applied for benefits and were notified that the disqualification no 
longer applied. In the interim, the former employer contacted the 
claimants and re-offered their positions. Claimants refused to accept 
the offers, maintaining their desire to be extricated from the labor dis-
pute still in progress. The Michigan Employment Security Commission 
(MESC) determined that the claimants were not disqualified from se-
curing benefits, and the employer, Top O'Michigan Rural Electric 
Company, appealed. 137 
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that claimants who have 
been disqualified from unemployment benefits and who serve the re-
quisite requalification period, and then subsequently reapply for ben-
efits may no longer be disqualified if the basis for refusing to return to 
the same work does not meet the statutory criteria for "suitable 
work."138 The court arrived at this decision by analyzing the distinc-
tion between suitable and non-suitable work offers. Work available 
due to a labor dispute was found not to be suitable within the meaning 
of the Act, and thus should not serve to disqualify the claimants. 139 
The merits of the labor dispute were considered inconsequential to the 
resolution of the case. 140 
134. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 421.29(8) (Supp. 1983-84). 
135. Id. 
136. 118 Mich. App. 275, 324 N.W.2d 603 (1982). 
137. Id. at 278.324 N.W.2d at 604. 
138. Id. at 281-82, 324 N.W.2d at 605-06. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 283, 324 N.W.2d at 606-07. 
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B. Representation at Hearings 
In a case of first impression, and one which should be of special in-
terest to practitioners in this specialized field of law as well as to the 
members of the legal profession in general, the court of appeals decided 
whether an agent representing a claimant at a MESC hearing had to 
be a duly licensed attorney. An obvious case for amicus curiae activity, 
the State Bar of Michigan intervened in Michigan Hospital Associa-
tion v. MESC. 141 
Challenged in this case was whether an employer could be repre-
sented in a proceeding before MESC by counsel or other duly authorized 
agent. The court began its analysis by examining the phrase "duly 
authorized agent. "142 Mter defining an agent as one who has an ex-
press or implied authority to represent or act on behalf of another per-
son, the court went on to discuss the scope of judicial and legislative 
powers in the area of the definition and regulation of the practice of 
law.143 Concluding that representation of clients in contested cases 
before administrative bodies fell within the scope of the practice of 
law, the court determined that the use of unskilled practitioners would 
undermine the legislative intent of ensuring that claimants in contested 
cases receive competent aid. 144 
A more insightful analysis of whether a non-attorney can represent 
an employer in proceedings before the MESC was found in State Bar 
of Michigan v. Galloway.145 In an effort to reduce the negative fallout 
effects of their prior decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals com-
pletely reversed itself and held that non-attorneys are not precluded 
from serving as agents in administrative proceedings. 146 
The decision of the court was divided into three important sections, 
each of which will be analyzed separately. In the first part, the court 
addressed the specific issue of whether section 31 of the Michigan 
Employment Security Act (MESA),147 prevents agents who are not 
licensed attorneys from appearing before the commission on behalf of 
individuals claiming benefits under the Act. 148 The court reviewed the 
language of the Act, and then proceeded to review the amendatory 
language to section 31 which added this clause: "An employer may be 
represented in any proceeding before the commission by counsel or 
141. 123 Mich. App. 667, 333 N.W.2d 319 (1983). 
142. Id. at 670, 333 N.W.2d at 320. 
143. Id. at 670·71, 333 N.W.2d at 320·21. 
144. Id. 
145. 124 Mich. App. 271, 335 N.W.2d 475 (1983) (leave to appeal pending). 
146. Id. at 279, 335 N.W.2d at 478. 
147. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 421.31 (Supp. 1983·84). 
148. 124 Mich. App. at 276·79, 335 N.W.2d at 477-78. 
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other duly authorized agent."149 The State Bar had assumed a typical 
posture and argued that the legislative term "duly authorized agent" 
permits a non-attorney to represent an employer "only to the extent 
that such representation is ministerial in nature and falls short of con-
stituting the practice of law."15o 
The court of appeals unequivocally rejected this position and 
observed that the language of the amendatory provision should be 
read in conjunction with the earlier enacted language of section 31 
and that neither should render the other a nullity. "[W]here statutes 
are £n par£ mater£a, each must be given effect if such can be done 
without repugnancy, absurdity or unreasonableness." 151 The court 
proceeded to note that if a specific statute is enacted subsequent to the 
adoption of a generally worded statute, then the more specifically 
worded statute would be given force and effect in the event of a con-
flict. 152 Thus, an agent need not be an attorney to appear before 
MESC. The court made it abundantly clear, however, that the specific 
language of the amendatory provision entitled individuals to be repre-
sented by agents of their own selection only before the MESC.153 Prac-
titioners concerned with the unauthorized practice of law should take 
solace in the fact that the decision provided a distinction between ad-
ministrative proceedings of a fact-finding nature, and proceedings in 
courts of law. 
The second part of the decision addressed the issue of whether the 
judiciary had the power to reject the legislative enactment and to de-
clare it null and void. 154 The court answered this question in the nega-
tive, contending that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the 
judiciary from impinging upon legislative territory. The State Bar had 
argued that the ultimate authority to define and regulate the practice 
of law lies in the judiciary and that, accordingly, it could reject 
legislative enactments if they are found to contravene public policy. 
The court rejected this argument z"n toto. It then concluded that while 
the judiciary has the inherent power to regulate the qualifications of 
persons who may be permitted to practice law, such authority can also 
exist in the legislature. 155 Certainly, the legislative body has an equal 
voice in demanding that control be exercised over the regulation of the 
149. [d. at 275, 335 N.W.2d at 477 (quoting 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 338 
(codified at MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 421.31 (Supp. 1983-84». 
150. [d. at 276,335 N.W.2d at 477. 
151. [d. at 277, 335 N.W.2d at 477 (citing Rochester Community Schools Bd. 
of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 104 Mich. App. 569, 578-79, 305 N.W.2d 541, 545 
(1981) ). 
152. 124 Mich. App. at 277,335 N.W.2d at 478. 
153. [d. at 279, 335 N.W.2d at 478. 
154. [d. at 279-83,335 N.W.2d at 478-80. 
155. [d. at 280,335 N.W.2d at 479. 
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practice of law in furtherance of its responsibility to protect the public 
welfare. 156 The court terminated its discussion on this issue by quoting 
Justice Levin, who wrote separately in State Bar of Michigan v. 
Cramer l57 : 
The judiciary may assert but does not legitimately have the 
inherent, constitutionaly implied power to bar non-lawyers 
from pursuing their vocations on a finding of impingement on 
work sometimes or traditionally done by lawyers. Occupational 
licensing of non-lawyers is a legislative preorgative; unless the 
Legislature were to authorize non-lawyers to appear in court, 
there is no intrusion of judicial power. 158 
The final area addressed by the court was the statutory preclusion 
of a corporation representing an employer in proceedings before the 
MESC.159 The court swiftly disposed of this issue by comparing the 
conflicting language in section 31 which prevents a corporation or vol-
untary association from practicing or appearing as an attorney-at-law 
for a person in 'court or before a judicial body with the amendatory 
language, and applying the established rules of statutory construction. 
It properly held that the latter statute does not prohibit corporations 
from representing employers under section 31. 160 
As expected, the State Bar of Michigan has sought leave to appeal 
from the Michigan Supreme Court. Cautious in formulating a prog-
nostication, the author believes that the Michigan Supreme Court will 
be equally cautious about rendering a decision which would have dev-
astating effects for persons maintaining vocations outside of the prac-
t£ce of law but which nevertheless involve parallel responsibilities. It 
would behoove the court to preserve the court of appeals' distinction 
between those who practice law in courts of law versus those who pro-
vide guidance and expertise to claimants in administrative fact-find-
ing proceedings. From a constitutional perspective, only by preserving 
this distinction, as obviously intended by the legislature, can the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine remain intact. 
VIII. CONCLUsON 
A noted scholar and jurist once remarked about the role of the 
judge and the judicial process: 
156. Id. 
157. 399 Mich. 116, 249 N.W.2d 1 (1976). 
158. 124 Mich. App. at 282,335 N.W.2d at 480 (quoting State Bar of Michigan 
v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116, 158 n.24, 249 N.W.2d 1, 18 n.24 (1976) (Levin, J., 
separate opinion». 
159. 124 Mich. App. at 283·85, 335 N.W.2d at 480·81. 
160. Id. at 284, 335 N.W.2d at 481. 
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The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another 
sense ephemeral. What is good in it endures. What is erron-
eous is pretty sure to perish. The good remains the foundation 
on which new structures will be built. The bad will be rejected 
and cast off in the laboratory of the years. Little by little the 
old doctrine is undermined. Often the encroachments are so 
gradual that their significance is at first obscured. Finally we 
discover that the contour of the landscape has been changed, 
that the old maps must be cast aside, and the ground charted 
anew. I61 
To deal with abstract dogmas, definitions, illusions, myths, vag-
aries, moral values, and to provide some type of symmetrical develop-
ment in the law requires adherence and commitment to the "pervad-
ing spirit of the law." The amalgam of decisions cited in this article 
suggest that despite the introspection, deliberation and analysis by the 
courts, symmetrical development in the law is impossible, or at best, 
difficult to attain. Achieving equilibrium in regulating the interests 
between labor and management and simultaneously maintaining 
social utility was not achieved vis-a-vis the diverse judgments analyzed 
in this article. Perhaps the judicial process only requires intervention, 
not consistency, creativity or symmetry. If that is the case, then the 
courts have essentially met their task. 
161. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921). 
